Two principles in many-valued logic

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Classically, two propositions are logically equivalent precisely when they are true under the same logical valuations. Also, two logical valuations are distinct if, and only if, there is a formula that is true according to one valuation, and false according to the other. By a real-valued logic we mean a many-valued logic in the sense of Petr Hájek that is complete with respect to a subalgebra of truth values of a BL-algebra given by a continuous triangular norm on [0, 1]. Abstracting the two foregoing properties from classical logic leads us to two principles that a real-valued logic may or may not satisfy. We prove that the two principles are sufficient to characterise Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic, to within extensions. We also prove that, under the additional assumption that the set of truth values be closed in the Euclidean topology of [0,1], the two principles also afford a characterisation of Product logic.